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What effect, if any, does a change in type of government have on the degree of media 
personalization? We argue that, the different incentives that single and multi-party 
governments provide to individual politicians and parties affect the level of media 
personalization. Where the parties are more involved (i.e. multi-party coalitions) 
there will be less media personalization. In contrast, where a single individual can 
command the party, there will be more media personalization. We test these 
assumptions with a novel dataset created from over one million newspaper articles 
covering a continuous 24-year period in the UK. We find that the switch to a 
coalition government in 2010 indeed changed the dynamics of media 
personalization. These findings not only provide key insights into the phenomenon 
of personalization but also enable us to better understand some of the potential 
consequences of changes in government types for power dynamics and democratic 
accountability.  
Key words: Personalization, UK, coalition, media, parties  
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What effect, if any, does a switch between single and multi-party governments have 
on the degree of personalization? In the last few decades personalization has often been 
described as a key characteristic of contemporary politics and political communication 
(McAllister 1996; Mughan 2000; Poguntke and Webb 2005b; van Aelst, Sheafer and Stanyer 
2012). Broadly defined, the process of personalization is understood as an increase over 
time in the centrality and autonomy of individual politicians at the expense of collective 
institutions (parties, cabinets and parliaments). Personalization can affect the role of 
individuals in government, in voting behavior, in campaign communication, and in media 
coverage, with each of these dimensions potentially reinforcing one another. It is then not 
surprising that the phenomenon raises strong normative concerns, especially in 
parliamentary democracies; it does so regarding its potential impact on the balance of 
power within the executive and between the executive and the legislature, on the role of 
political parties, on the rationality of electoral behavior, and on the quality of media 
coverage and therefore on citizens’ ability to keep their representatives accountable (see 
Adams and Maier 2010; Langer 2011 for overviews).  
This paper focuses specifically on media personalization. Although media and 
political personalization are distinct phenomena, they are also interdependent and thus the 
media dimension of personalization matters well beyond itself (Poguntke and Webb 
2005a). In fact, research has demonstrated that although changes in the political 
dimensions often come first, the degree of media personalization in turn can affect the 
political behavior, standing, and legitimacy of different political actors (Rahat and Sheafer 
2007, 70). For instance, a higher degree of media personalization can enhance the power 
resources of the prime minister vis-à-vis the cabinet and Parliament as well as affording her 
more autonomy from the party (Bennister and Heffernan 2012, 786). Similarly, a higher 
degree of personalization encourages voting behavior based more strongly  on individual, 
rather than (merely), on a partisan basis because ‘personalized media coverage primes 
personalized voting behavior’ (Takens et al. 2015, 249).  
Personalization research, especially on its media dimensions, has focused mostly on 
exploring longitudinal trends, with mixed results.  While some have found positive (non-
linear) trends (Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000; Karvonen 2010; Krauss and 
Nyblade 2005; McAllister 2007; Rahat and Sheafer 2007), others report scarcely any 
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evidence of increase over time (e.g. Kriesi 2012; Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden and Boumans 
2011). In relation specifically to the UK, research has provided fairly clear, albeit not 
unanimous, support for a rise on media personalization, especially for the 
presidentialization thesis (Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013; Langer 2011; 
Mughan 2000; but see Kriesi 2012). 
In contrast to the growing longitudinal literature, research about the impact of the 
characteristics of the political system (and especially regime type and electoral and party 
variables) on the degree of media personalization is rare, especially studies providing actual 
comparative data (Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013; Dalton and Wattenberg 
2000; Holtz-Bacha, Langer and Merkle 2014; Kriesi 2012; Van Aelst et al. 2016). There is 
nonetheless consensus that institutions are key for explaining variations in the degree of 
personalization (Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000; Karvonen 2010; Kriesi 2012; 
Mughan 2000; Poguntke and Webb 2005b; Van Aelst et al. 2016) .  Yet, the impact of 
coalition government dynamics has been generally overlooked, and in fact most often not 
mentioned at all. Moreover, little to no attention has been paid to how changes in the 
political setting affects the degree of media personalization. Specifically, to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no studies focusing on what happens when the type of government 
changes.   
The lack of attention to the impact of coalitions in the degree of media 
personalization, and especially a switch between systems, is rather puzzling given the 
significant effect that single vs. multi party governments have on individuals and party 
dynamics. Research on political institutions has demonstrated how different types of 
government—and hence changes from one to the other—affect the role of different actors, 
especially the relationships between individual politicians and collective institutions 
(Colomer 2002; Laver and Shepsle 1990; Lijphart 2012; Rose 1991). This literature, 
however, has generally ignored the role of the media. As a result, despite the strong 
empirical links between the degree of media personalization and the characteristics of 
political institutions, how changes in the latter affect the former has rarely been analyzed 
(Rahat and Sheafer 2007 the most outstanding exception). 
 Thus, our research question asks: what effect, if any, does a switch between single 
and multi-party governments have on the degree of media personalization? Although type 
of government is key, it cannot be assumed that the differences will automatically transfer 
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across systems. The impact of the change in type of government is mediated by institutional 
variables and norms; for instance, those of a majoritarian democracy in the UK. As such, the 
overall characteristics of the system are not transformed overnight, but there are important 
adjustments. In this regard, as will be discussed below, much of the coalition politics 
literature points out multi-party governments survive through complex arrangements that 
enable parties to cooperate rather than to fight. This cooperation typically expands the role 
of parties and diffuses power across a number of cabinet offices (reducing those of top 
officials such as the Prime Minister, or Minister of Finance). In other words, the presence of 
coalition governments tends to diminish the degree of political personalization.   
In light of these findings we ask whether the same process applies to media 
personalization. Although the media in some ways mirrors the developments taking place in 
the political system, the characteristics of the coverage are strongly shaped by a number of 
other factors that have to do with news values, journalistic routines and norms, and market 
conditions (O’Neill and Harcup 2009; Shoemaker and Reese 2013). Hence, a change in the 
degree of media personalization due to the presence of a coalition can be expected but not 
assumed, and thus needs to be empirically tested.   
The scarcity of data in this regard is in contrast to the empirical reality. While there 
are a significant number of countries that have either just coalitions or single party 
governments, there are also many that change between arrangements. As Figure 1 shows, 
for instance, about half of OECD countries have switched between single party and multi-
party coalition governments quite regularly in the last 40 years.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Research on media personalization has for the most part focused on those countries 
that are stable in terms of type of government, especially Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK (e.g. Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013; Mughan 2000; Wilke and 
Reinemann 2001). Moreover, the former two are also highly similar in terms of a number of 
coalition-specific features and institutional rules (Martin and Vanberg 2008, 506). For the 
UK case, which had a coalition government from 2010 to 2015, there have not been studies 
analyzing the impact of this change on media personalization, or personalization more 
generally (bar Bennister and Heffernan 2015)  
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We test our theoretical expectations in the UK using a novel longitudinal dataset 
that spans a period of over 24 years. The UK is especially suited for our aims firstly because 
of its long history of single party governments and secondly because of the positive trends 
found in the degree of media personalization over time (Boumans, Boomgaarden and 
Vliegenthart 2013; Langer 2007, 2011; Mughan 2000). Furthermore, the existence of a 
coalition government from 2010 to 2015 allows us to test our hypotheses in a least-likely 
scenario. That is, if we are able to find differences in the level of media personalization in 
single party vs. coalition governments in this highly personalized case with strong norms of 
single-party government, then it could be expected that similar changes take in place in 
other settings.  
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the concept of media 
personalization followed by how political institutions are expected to shape it, in particular 
coalition politics. After we present our hypotheses, we proceed to describe the research 
design and to present our data and analysis. We conclude with a discussion of our findings 
and its implications for understanding personalization of politics, types of governments, 
and the interaction between the two. 
The Personalization of politics and its media dimensions 
As discussed above, the central tenet of the personalization of politics literature is 
that there has been an increase over time in the centrality and autonomy of individual 
politicians at the expense of collective institutions (parties, cabinets and parliaments) which 
is manifested in, and in turn is reinforced by, personalized media coverage. Related to this 
concept, the somewhat contentious presidentialization of politics thesis states there has 
been a shift in power resources and accountability within parties and governments, 
comprised of more leader-centred electoral processes, greater accumulation of leaders’ 
power resources within the executive and growing mutual autonomy between leaders and 
their parliamentary supporters’ (Webb and Poguntke 2013, 653).  
Media personalization is also best understood as a multi-dimensional concept. Most 
of the recent literature (e.g. Adam and Maier 2010; Karvonen 2010; Langer 2011; van Aelst, 
Sheafer and Stanyer 2012) agrees that it is necessary to distinguish between at least two 
dimensions: firstly, a change in the overall visibility of different actors, specifically from 
collective institutions to individuals; and secondly, a shift in the focus of that attention, with 
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a greater emphasis on the personalities of politicians and especially their personal—rather 
than strictly political—dimensions. van Aelst, Sheafer and Stanyer (2012) label these two 
categories of media personalization as individualization and privatization. We focus in this 
paper on the former.  
Within individualization it is necessary to distinguish two sub-dimensions based on 
the two collective actors that are said to lose prominence as a result of personalization: 
political parties and cabinets. The first dimension is fairly straightforward: personalization 
implies more attention to individual politicians relative to the party they represent. Within 
this, general (van Aelst, Sheafer and Stanyer 2012) or decentralized (Balmas et al. 2014) 
personalization refers to an increase in relative attention towards all individual politicians, 
whereas centralized or concentrated personalization is specifically in relation to individuals 
at the top. The second dimension is closely associated with the concept of the 
‘presidentialization of politics’ (Foley 2000, Mughan 2000, Poguntke and Webb 2005), 
which  in relation to the media  is expected to lead to a ‘leadership stretch’: coverage that is 
even more leader/prime minister-centered (they have always been the focal point of 
coverage) and that might have ‘the effect of displacing cabinet ministers into relative 
obscurity and of marginalizing other political institutions to the periphery of public 
attention’ (Foley 2004, 293). It also makes sense to incorporate in our conceptualization, as 
some others have done (Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013; McAllister 2011; 
van Aelst, Sheafer and Stanyer 2012), an in-between approach, where not only the leader 
but a small elite of heavy weight party/government individuals increasingly dominate the 
coverage. Within government, this elite is generally defined as ministers occupying one of 
the Great Offices of State, i.e. Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Home Affairs and Deputy Prime 
Minister, where present.  
The different dimensions of media personalization, and specifically 
individualization, are summarized in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Dimensions of media personalization (individualization)  
Dimension/definition Increased attention to Relative to 
Decentralized (or 
general) 
personalization 
All individual cabinet 
members 
Party; cabinet  
Centralized 
personalization 
(Presidentialization and 
‘leadership stretch’) 
Head of government  Party; all other cabinet members; 
ministers at top departments or 
‘great offices’  
Centralized 
personalization (Heavy 
weights) 
Ministers at top 
departments or ‘great 
offices’ 
Party; lower ranked ministers 
 
Coalition governments: a challenge to the personalization of politics? 
How do we expect the switch to a coalition government to affect the personalization 
of politics? Although as shown in the previous section research about personalization—and 
especially that focusing on the media—has generally overlooked the impact of the 
distinctive dynamics of multi-party governments, the literature about coalitions, both in 
general as well as some work focusing specifically on the UK during 2010-2015 (Atkins 
2015; Bennister and Heffernan 2012, 2015), does enable us to draw some hypotheses. It is 
worth highlighting again that the characteristics of the coverage tend to reflect changes in 
the institutional realm but are also strongly shaped by a number of other factors which have 
to do with news values, journalistic routines and norms, and market conditions. Hence 
change in the degree of media personalization due to the presence of a coalition cannot be 
assumed. First, we discuss what we know about the impact of coalitions on the role of 
political parties, followed by their effect on the role of the prime minister and the rest of the 
cabinet. 
During coalition governments, there are several reasons to expect parties—defined 
both as an institutionalized collective actor and a group of individuals acting more or less 
coordinately under the same ‘label’ (Vercesi 2016)—to play a greater role than in single-
party governments. For starters, there are more parties in government and hence more 
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relevant party-related activity. But it is not just about numbers. Gay, Schleiter and Belu 
(2015) summarize well the challenges that coalitions bring for parties:  
‘In single-party governments party cohesion is equal to government cohesion. 
As a result, government cohesion is high on average, which limits the need for 
negotiation and compromise and the frequency of open disagreements in the 
day-to-day management of government. This benefits the day-to-day 
management of government priorities by the executive. In contrast, coalitions 
require parties with different policy aims, divergent electoral priorities, 
competing desires to control ministerial portfolios and different intrinsic group 
identities to work together’ (Gay, Schleiter and Belu 2015, 119) . 
As a result of these dynamics, coalitions necessitate policy and communication 
coordination as well as bargaining and oversight mechanisms across the different members 
of government and their legislative parties (Martin 2004; Sagarzazu and Klüver 2017; 
Zubek and Klüver 2015). This makes the party as collective actor more prominent, as well 
as expanding the number and roles of party actors involved in government-related 
activities. In addition, when two (or more) parties govern together, there is more potential 
for conflict. Given that conflict is one of most influential news values (O’Neill and Harcup 
2009; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000), this dynamic is particularly likely to generate an 
increase in news coverage of the party, and hence lower media personalization. Conflict 
emerges not only because of disagreements across parties but also because of the likely 
presence of greater intra-party discontent, which is a typical coalitional problem (Vercesi 
2016). This is particularly likely to be the case in countries like the UK were single-party 
governments are the norm because in addition to policy compromises, which to an extent 
characterize any coalition, intra-party discontent is also likely to arise from the reduced 
number of ministerial portfolios available for the party and the perceived failure of the 
leader to win the election outright. For example, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government in the UK endured unprecedented levels of intra-party dissent, 
including backbench rebellions (Atkins 2015; Heppell 2014). Drawing on the above, we can 
formulate the first of our hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: 
During the coalition government there will be decreases in both centralized and decentralized 
media personalization vis-à-vis the party.  
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Secondly, as a consequence of the way politics plays out in coalitions, the head of 
government can be expected to lose some of their pre-eminence vis-à-vis cabinet ministers. 
Generally speaking, the levels of the Prime Minister’s power are understood to be greatly 
influenced by his/her freedom to hire and fire cabinet ministers; the degree of autonomy to 
set the government’s and parliament’s agenda; and the ability to get his/her preferred 
policies accepted and enacted in Parliament (O'Malley 2007). In these regards, the UK prime 
minister’s power has been consistently regarded to be at the stronger end of the continuum 
(King 1994; Lijphart 2012; O'Malley 2007; Rose 1991), with the process of 
presidentialization arguably stretching it—at times at least—further (Poguntke and Webb 
2005a).  
But, regardless of the starting point, how much heads of government can make use 
of these power resources will be strongly affected by the composition of the government. In 
this regard, as Andeweg (2000) highlights, the literature quite unanimously concludes that 
heads of single-party majority governments are in a much better position to make use of 
whatever formal powers are available to them than heads of coalition governments. In fact, 
each of the dimensions above are likely to be negatively affected by the existence of a 
coalition government both because of the presence of the junior partner(s) and the 
weakened power resources of the prime minister vis-à-vis the party. As a result, in 
opposition to the presidentialization thesis, where power within the executive increasingly 
concentrates in the Prime Minister, research has shown that coalitions disperse power 
across the cabinet as a result of the weakened ability of the premier to command the cabinet 
and party (Bennister and Heffernan 2012, 2015) as well as because of the mechanisms in 
place to keep control of the coalition pact (Carroll and Cox 2012). These studies have not 
addressed, however, the role of the media. Nonetheless, given the relationship between the 
two we can draw the following hypothesis 
Hypothesis 2A: 
During the coalition government there will be decreases in media ’presidentialization’ (i.e. 
relative visibility of the prime minister vis-à-vis ministers, both of the Great Offices and the rest 
of the cabinet); 
The fact that the head of government is expected to be weaker ‘does not imply that 
coalition governments are models of ministerial equality’ (Andeweg 2000, 383). The 
functional equivalent of a powerful prime minister is very often present in the form of a 
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collective coalition leadership (Andeweg 2000). For instance this was the case in the UK 
Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition with the so-called `Quad’ composed by both 
party leaders, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his second-in-command from the Lib-
Dems (Hayton 2014). Moreover, because of the power-sharing arrangements of the 
coalition, it is usually the case that the party leaders of the other member(s) of the coalition 
take some of  the most important offices (Andeweg 2000). This has been the case for 
example in the German coalition tradition, where the junior partner gets the Vice-
chancellorship and the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In addition, ministers of the junior party, 
regardless of the size of their departments, tend to have more prominence than that 
normally associated with their portfolio because of their role in overseeing the senior party 
(Carroll and Cox 2012). Furthermore, and more specifically regarding media coverage, 
these ministers are likely to get more attention than their post generally attracts because of 
their potential newsworthiness as voices of intra-coalition conflict and dissent.  
As such, while we hypothesized that the prime minister will lose visibility vis-à-vis 
the Great Offices and the rest of the cabinet (2a above), there are countervailing forces 
regarding the prominence of the Great Office vs. other ministers. Thus our final hypothesis 
states that:  
Hypothesis 2B 
During the coalition government the other dimension of centralized personalization, ‘heavy 
weights’ (i.e. ministers in Great Offices vs the rest of the cabinet) will not show significant 
change.  
Research Design 
Having defined the hypotheses, we now proceed to test these theoretical 
expectations. To do so we will first define our case of study. This will be followed by a 
description of the dataset we collated and how we created our independent and dependent 
variables.  
Case: UK 
The UK presents a unique opportunity for testing our hypotheses. During our time 
frame the UK had three single party governments under both the Labour and Conservative 
parties followed by a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government, in place from 
 11
April 2010 to May 2015, which was replaced by a single party Conservative government. 
Moreover, in the UK, as discussed above, most previous studies have found a high degree of 
media personalization as well as a positive trend over time, hence making it an ideal case 
for exploring whether the change in government type disrupts structural trends (Boumans, 
Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013; Langer 2007, 2011; Mughan 2000). Furthermore, as 
the UK has had a long history of single party governments it could be expected that politics 
as usual would prevail. These characteristics make this case a natural experiment of sorts, 
one which allows us to test how media personalization is affected by the change in 
government type in a least-likely scenario. As such, if our least-likely case shows evidence of 
a diminishing level of media personalization during the coalition government then similar 
changes are also likely to apply in other settings, effectively highlighting the significance of 
the interrelationship between institutions—and their changes— and norms both in relation 
to government and media. 
Data 
In order to analyze how media personalization is affected by the presence of a 
coalition government we proceeded to collect newspaper articles from the seven UK 
newspapers with widest circulation, including both broadsheets (The Guardian, The Daily 
Telegraph, The Times and the Financial Times) and tabloids (the Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror 
and the Sun). The time frame under study is 10th of April 1992 (after the re-election of the 
Conservative government led by John Major) to 13th of July 2016 (last day of David 
Cameron’s as Prime Minister), hence continuously covering day-to-day coverage for over 24 
years1. This time frame allows us to cover four different Prime Ministers (including those 
often regarded as epitomes of collegial and ‘presidentialized’ leaders), a change of Prime 
Minister midway between elections, four general elections and, crucially for our aims, a 
coalition government, and a subsequent majority government. These settings provide a 
unique opportunity to evaluate the effect that a change in the type of government has on the 
degree of media personalization.   
The newspaper articles in our dataset were collected from searches on the 
LexisNexis database. The search strategy followed the operationalizations of the concepts 
                                                           
1 Due to Lexis-Nexis availability, for three of the newspapers we have only partial data: The Mirror 
starts in 29th May 1995 and The Sun and the Daily Telegraph from 1st January 2000. 
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explained above. We first collected the names of every individual who sat in cabinet during 
the period under study, finding a total of 147 ministers. We then use this list to search in 
Lexis Nexis. First, we searched all articles that mentioned each of these individuals plus the 
Prime Minister by full name during the period(s) they were in post2. We used both first and 
last name3 to minimize the number of false positives4. Secondly, we searched for articles 
mentioning the party/parties in government using the name of the party and its variations5. 
In order to systematically exclude false positives, we only downloaded articles that 
mentioned the party name with a capital letter at least once.6.  
In total, we found over 1.9 million newspaper articles in our 24-year period for 
members of the cabinet and governing parties. However, as each article is counted only 
once in the process of building our dataset, regardless of how many of the actors it 
mentions, this leaves a total of 1.1 million unique newspaper articles. The numbers varied 
across newspaper titles. In line with the size and style of each outlet, the three tabloids plus 
the Financial Times have a lower average than broadsheets: around 7,000 and 10,000 
newspaper articles per year respectively.  
Once all articles were downloaded, we carried out systematic manual checks to deal 
with any errors on the processes of downloading and archiving. Then we proceeded to 
aggregate the articles based on our operationalization of media personalization (Table 1). 
We grouped cabinet posts into: (1) the Prime Minister; (2) Top ministers which include the 
                                                           
2 For ministers from the House of Lords we had a threefold search strategy. We first searched for the 
combination of titles (e.g. Lady/Baroness or Lord/Baron) and last name. Then we included the title, 
one or several of the forenames and last names, before we added, in a last step, all combinations of 
the first and last names without the title. 
3 We also included the short version of the first names into the search string, when this is how the 
minister was generally known, e.g. Ed Miliband as well as Edward Miliband. 
4 In order to check the robustness of this search strategy, for a sample of ten ministers we also 
searched by last name only: in 89.7 percent of the articles the full name was used at least once. 
Moreover, there were no noteworthy differences between the two samples.  
5 The variations included Conservative, Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and Lib Dems, and 
for the Conservative party also Tory and Tories. 
6 By including only those articles which also featured capitalized ‘Labour’ or ‘Conservative’, we were 
able to systematically exclude articles not referring to the political parties such as mentions to 
‘labour market’ or ‘conservative estimates’. 
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three ‘Great Offices of State’: the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, and the 
Foreign Secretary plus the Deputy Prime-Minister (whenever the post was in use); and (3) 
Ministers: the rest of the cabinet.7 
 
Dependent Variables  
Once the dataset was cleaned of duplicates, we proceeded to aggregate all this 
information to a count of all newspaper articles for each month for the four groups of offices 
described above. In total our dataset covers over 24 years (1992-2016). However, for one of 
those years (1992), it covers only nine months as the timeframe starts after the April 
general election of 1992, and for 2016 it covers only six months as we ended collection with 
David’s Cameron resignation as PM. We divided the sample by newspaper type because of 
the differences that previous research has found (Kriesi 2012; Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden 
and Boumans 2011). This makes a total of 294 monthly observations for each of tabloids 
and broadsheets.   
Using this monthly data we proceeded to create our eight dependent variables (see 
figure 2), which cover the different dimensions of media personalization discussed in Table 
1. Because absolute figures are affected by the growth over time in newspaper pagination 
(Langer 2007) as well as the fact that some sources are not available for the full period, we 
measure personalization based on ratios. Ratios, which represent relative visibility (i.e. one 
actor vis-à-vis another) and control for these variations as well as any potential issues with 
archiving by Lexis-Nexis, are the best basis to test our hypotheses It is also how typically it 
has been done in the literature (Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000; Langer 2011; 
Mughan 2000; Wattenberg 1991). As such our dependent variables are references of 
individuals or sets of individuals vs. parties (figure 2.A) and references between different 
individuals or sets of individuals (i.e. one actor or set of actors relative to others) as 
depicted in figure 2.B. 8  
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                           
7 Table 1 in the online appendix lists all the cabinet offices included in our study.  
8 Because of the skewed distribution of the ratios we proceed to log-normalize our dependent 
variable. 
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Figure 2 suggests the presence of some interesting trends, but what is most striking 
is that there are considerable variations throughout. Figure 2A for instance shows that in 
almost all cases the visibility of the parties increase during elections. Also, the Prime 
Minister sees an increase in reporting since 1997, in line with the upward trends found in 
some of the literature; this trend however changes circa 2010 with the coalition 
government. The relative visibility of the Great Offices has also shown growth but there is 
also a clear drop in the late 2000’s, probably as a result of Gordon Brown—an exceptionally 
powerful minister—moving from Finance to the premiership in 2007. The patterns in 
Figure 2B (top offices vs. other offices) are also varied but overall suggest the presence of 
centralized personalization, with a ‘Brown effect’ again present in most figures; the relative 
visibility of the PM however drops with the arrival of the coalition government and raises 
again after 2015.  
 
Independent Variables   
To test our theoretical expectation that the change to a coalition government will be 
associated with a lower degree of personalization, we included a dummy variable with a 
value of one (1) if the government is a coalition and a zero (0) otherwise. 
The most important—albeit not uncontested—finding of the literature on media 
personalization so far, especially for the UK, has been the existence of a time trend (see 
above). Since, as discussed below, the inclusion of a trend variable does not bias the 
estimates of our coefficients (Box-Steffensmeier Janet M. and Smith 1996) we decided to 
include it for theoretical reasons. As such, similar to Boumans, Boomgaarden and 
Vliegenthart (2013), our first control variable is a (linear) count for every month in our 
dataset.  
We furthermore control for a number of variables that are known to affect the 
degree of personalization and/or the characteristics of coverage more generally. This 
includes first seasonal variations due to the summer recess (specifically August), because 
media coverage has quite distinctive characteristics during what is known as the ‘silly 
season’ (Franklin 2005); secondly, campaign periods, specifically the months affected by the 
dissolution of parliament: thirdly the months where there were changes of cabinet 
personnel either due to cabinet reshuffles or more broadly change of government, and a 
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dummy variable to account for the months since the EU referendum was announced until it 
was held (May-July 2016). In addition, we controlled for months where there were major 
international summits (i.e. meetings of the European Commission, G8 or G20) as it is the 
kind of event that has been hypothesized to increase presidentialization (Poguntke and 
Webb 2005a) and a previous study has shown that some of these have indeed affected the 
relative media visibility of different actors (Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 
2013). We also control for newspaper type (i.e. broadsheets and tabloids) as previous 
studies on personalization (Kriesi 2012; Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden and Boumans 2011) as 
well as political coverage more generally have found significant differences between the 
two (Franklin 2005) with the latter associated with  more simplified and personalized 
narratives (Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013). Due to the unique situation 
that existed after Tony Blair’s re-election in 2005, where there was great party pressure to 
push Blair out and promote Gordon Brown as the new Labour leader and Prime Minister 
(Quinn 2011), we have included a dummy to account for the possibility that the PM-in-
waiting factor altered reporting on the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  Finally, due to the 
irregular presence of the Deputy Prime Minister position, we have included a dummy 
variable to account for those periods with this additional Great Office (Kirkup and Thornton 
2015). These last two variables will only be used in the models including the Great offices 
(and hence the Chancellor and DPM respectively).  
 
Analysis 
Once the dataset was created we proceeded to analyze the extent to which a switch 
to a coalition government affects the degree of media personalization. Since we have a 
dataset constructed over time our first task is to check the time series properties of our 
dependent variables, specifically in order to remove time-dependent noise. To do this we 
carried out three steps. First, we checked for the presence of a Unit Root (using the Dickey 
Fuller and KPSS tests) and made sure our dependent variables were stationary.9 The tests 
for the presence of a unit root concluded that our series were stationary, and trend 
                                                           
9 Due to the panel structure of our dataset, where we have an observation per newspaper type per 
month, we performed the Dickey Fuller and KPSS tests first for the broadsheet sample and second for 
the tabloid sample. Results can be provided upon request. 
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stationary, and as such did not need to be trend corrected (Box-Steffensmeier Janet M. and 
Smith 1996). Second, we used the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions to 
identify the lag structure of our dependent variables. Based on this analysis we determined 
that our four series with Party as the denominator have a three-month lag structure (Table 
3), while our politicians time series have a five-month lag structure (Table 4). Given these 
lag structures we have included in each of the models the appropriate number of time lags 
(as recommended by Box and Jenkins (1970)), this means for instance that where the lag 
structure is a three-month lag (an AR(3) model) we include Yt-1, Yt-2, and Yt-3. Finally, after 
running each regression we performed the Portmanteau (Q) test to identify the presence of 
white noise in our residuals, of which there was none.10 
After doing all the necessary time series tests we proceeded to test our hypotheses. 
We did this by running two sets of linear regressions. The first set included the variables 
where we test the first hypothesis, i.e. that there is a decrease in media personalization in 
the parties dimension because of the coalition government (see Table 2). The second set 
tests hypothesis 2A and 2B, which refer to personalization of different groups of ministers 
vis-à-vis each other and the Prime Minister (see Table 3).  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2 shows the results for the four regressions where we compare politicians and 
parties. The first column compares only the Prime Minister, the second compares only the 
Great Offices (Prime Minister excluded), the third all other ministers, and the last column 
compares the full Cabinet to the party/parties in government. The results for the most part 
confirm hypothesis 1 in both the centralized and decentralized dimensions: there is a 
significant decrease in three of the four ratios during the coalition government, most 
especially for the Prime Minister. The third model, other ministers vs party, has a non-
significant coefficient for coalition. We argue that this is the case because—as hypothesis 2 
suggests based in the literature (see above)—in coalition governments lower ranked 
Ministers have a greater, and potentially more conflictive and hence newsworthy, role as 
                                                           
10 Due to the panel structure of our dataset, where we have an observation per newspaper type per 
month, we performed the Q test first for the broadsheet sample and second for the tabloid sample. 
We report both scores. 
 17
representatives of the junior party (or parties). This increased attention to other ministers 
is also consistent with the findings of our second hypothesis discussed below.  
Figure 3 shows the change in the average number of monthly articles mentioning 
the government parties based on the margins obtained by changing the coalition variable 
while holding all other variables constant. For the PM model, there is an average increase 
per month of about 140 extra articles mentioning the government parties during coalition 
times versus single party governments. Given that in our sample the monthly average of 
articles referring to the government party/ies is roughly 900, this is about a 14% increase 
in the attention that the party receives as a consequence of the switch to a coalition 
government. For the other three models the effect is smaller, 7%, 3%, and 5% increase 
party vs. Great Offices, other Cabinet Ministers, and all Cabinet respectively. The control 
variables in the models behave mostly as it would be expected from previous findings in the 
literature. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 3 tests the expectations from our second hypothesis. The first three columns 
show that during the coalition government there is a decrease in media ’presidentialization’ 
or ‘leadership stretch’ (i.e. relative visibility of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis cabinet 
members, both ‘heavy weights’ and others). The data confirms hypothesis 2a: the change to 
a coalition government reduces the centrality of the Prime Minister relative to the cabinet.. 
On average there are 150, 113 and 110 fewer articles per month for the Prime minister 
compared to the entire cabinet, to just the Great Offices, or just to the cabinet without the 
Great Offices respectively (see Figure 4); this is roughly a 18%, 14% and 13% decrease 
during the coalition. Also, contrary to hypothesis 2.b but consistent with the findings in 
hypothesis 1, the relative visibility of the occupants of the Great Offices vs. the rest of the 
cabinet ministers also sees a statistically significant decrease from being in a coalition 
versus a single-party government of about 7%. The control variables mostly behave in the 
way that would be expected. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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Conclusion 
So far the bulk of systematic research carried out on personalization of politics has 
focused on finding, or disproving, the existence of an upward time trend. These studies, 
while providing significant insight into these dynamics, have for the most part shied away 
from understanding how changes in institutional settings might affect this phenomenon. In 
this paper we make a first attempt at understanding how a change in type of government, 
between a single party and a multi-party coalition, affects the degree of the personalization 
of politics, specifically in its media dimension. 
We find that the change to a coalition government is associated with a lower level of 
media personalization especially media ‘presidentialization’ as the Prime Minister loses 
prominence in the coverage in relation to both the party and other cabinet ministers. These 
findings are reinforced by the fact that our dataset includes also the first majority 
government after the coalition period where, to a large extent, there was a reversal to pre-
coalition media personalization patterns. This demonstrates firstly that the presence of a 
coalition government altered the dynamics, hence reinforcing the importance of paying 
attention to changes in type of government and more broadly to institutional variables 
when analyzing personalization. Secondly, it shows that although the degree of media 
personalization—at least in the UK—has increased over time and according to our data 
continues to do so, for the most part; these trends are clearly neither smooth nor 
irreversible. In fact, fluctuations very much characterize the phenomenon, and hence it is 
essential for further research to try to uncover the factors that explain them. Thirdly, our 
analysis reveals that different dimensions of personalization were affected by the change of 
government to varying degrees, reinforcing the importance of distinguishing them 
conceptually and empirically. Finally, the analysis confirms that, despite mediatization 
(Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Strömbäck 2008) and hence the increasing influence of the 
media logic over politics, changes in the political realm continue to strongly shape the 
characteristics of media coverage.  
In this regard, although our analysis does not identify causal relationships, it is 
rather evident that the institutional change, and hence the political dimensions, came first. 
At the same time, it is likely that the changes in the degree of media personalization in turn 
shaped the behavior of politicians, hence closing the feedback loop on the Politics-Media-
Politics model that has been found in the past for personalization (Rahat and Sheafer 2007) 
and more generally for the media-politics relationship (Wolfsfeld 2011). There is need for 
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further studies however that enable us to better understand how political personalization 
affects the media dimension and vice versa.  
In relation to the literature on coalitions, our analysis confirms several of its finding 
from a perspective of media coverage of the coalitions and its actors. First, in terms of 
power dynamics it confirms the extent to which parties are crucial for the day-to-day of 
multi-party governments; and the weakening of the power resources of the prime minister 
vis-à-vis other members of the cabinet, as seen through media visibility. This finding is 
important because it shows that media reporting seems to adapt to the particular dynamics 
that exist in coalition governments: as power is diffused between different cabinet members 
and coalition parties so is media reporting. In other words, the political dynamics found in 
the literature on coalition politics (Bennister and Heffernan 2015; Carroll and Cox 2012; 
Martin 2004; Sagarzazu and Klüver 2015; Zubek and Klüver 2015)  seem to be reflected in, 
and most importantly strengthened by, media reporting.  
Second, as argued by Müller and Meyer (Müller and Meyer 2010a; Müller and Meyer 
2010b) coalition parties can, and indeed do, use sources external to the coalition for 
patrolling and exerting control over other actors in the coalition. In this regard, our analysis 
of the changes in the coverage of coalition ministers and parties suggests that in multi-party 
governments the media can help coalition parties by providing an external source of 
ministerial behavior reporting, hence lessening the problem of imperfect information 
(Lupia and McCubbins 1998). 
Our findings also pose interesting questions about the normative implications of 
personalization, both in general and specifically in the presence of coalitions. On the one 
hand, the changes we found can be regarded as a positive development as both parties and 
cabinets play a key role in democratic politics—especially in parliamentary democracies—
which is precisely one of the key reasons why the phenomenon of personalization triggers 
alarm bells. On the other hand, the fact that coalition governments change the dynamics of 
media reporting of the cabinet and the parties poses interesting questions regarding clarity 
of responsibility. It has been long argued (e.g. Powell and Whitten (1993)) that it is easier 
for citizens to hold elected officials accountable in single-party governments because there 
are clearer lines of responsibilities. This is in contrast to coalition governments which, it is 
argued, make it more difficult for voters to reward/punish good/bad performance. In this 
regard, personalization can play a crucial role because: ‘focusing attention on the prime 
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minister as the individual who is accountable for the government’s collective performance, 
[makes] it easier [for the public] to deliver reward or punishment, particularly when 
compared to an abstract collective’ (McAllister 2011, 64).  If, as found here, media reporting 
of coalitions places less emphasis on the prime minister, and more coverage on the rest of 
the cabinet as well as the government parties, voters could arguably have a harder time 
assessing government performance. Obviously our findings cannot tell us which of these 
two interpretations of democratic accountability are more appropriate. But they do 
highlight the theoretical and normative relevance of investigating media personalization.  
Our analysis is particularly timely because, while the UK coalition government might 
have been an exception to the rule of single-party governments, it is not an isolated case. In 
the UK itself, the 2017 snap election failed to return a majority government. Moreover, for 
instance Spain, another country with stable single-party governments backed by a strong 
mostly two-party system, has seen, since the return to democracy, the emergence of new 
competitive parties and the real possibility of a multi-party government. In the opposite 
direction Denmark, after a history of coalition governments since 1982, elected in 2015 a 
single-party minority government. Furthermore, there are—as shown in figure 1—a 
significant number of OECD democracies that constantly switch between single and multi-
party governments. These trends make it highly relevant to extend the study of 
personalization of politics to include changes in types of government.  More broadly, it calls 
for studies of the effects of changes in types of governments to pay greater attention to the 
role of media coverage.  
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Figure 1. Number of changes from single party to coalition governments (OECD 1980-
2015) 
 
 Source: ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2016) 
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Figure 2.A Rations of personalization – Offices versus government party/parties 
 
Figure 2.B Rations of Personalization – Top offices versus lower offices 
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Table 2. Regression coefficients for personalization vis-à-vis governing party/parties 
 PM v Party Great Offices v 
Party 
Other 
Ministers v 
Party 
All ministers  
v Party 
Time trend 
0.001*** 0.0001 -0.001*** 0.0001 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Coalition 
-0.135*** -0.069** -0.026 -0.082*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Parliament 
Dissolved 
-0.197*** -0.208*** -0.455*** -0.257*** 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) 
August Recess 
-0.074*** -0.080** -0.122*** -0.081*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Change of 
PM/government 
0.249*** 0.415*** 0.727*** 0.442*** 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) 
Major 
international 
summits 
0.121*** 0.068** 0.072*** 0.085*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Cabinet 
reshuffles 
-0.017 0.050* 0.081*** 0.038** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
PM-in-waiting - 
0.096*** 
- 
0.034 
(0.03) (0.02) 
DPM - 
0.107*** 
- 
0.029** 
(0.03) (0.14) 
Brexit 
-0.158* 0.087 -0.043 -0.052 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) 
Broadsheet 
0.001 0.031* 0.039** 0.017 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Yt-1 
0.608*** 0.648*** 0.575*** 0.693*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Yt-2 
0.055 0.032 0.042 -0.031 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Yt-3 0.163*** 0.091** 0.061 0.131*** 
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(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 
-0.271*** -0.158* 0.170*** 0.109** 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) 
     
N 576.000 576.000 576.000 576.000 
F 174 112 94 121 
R-sqr 0.788 0.737 0.667 0.750 
Q stat (p of )     
Broadsheet 
51.54 (0.10) 41.62 (0.40) 32.85 (0.78) 53.87 (0.07) 
Tabloids 42.75 (0.35) 33.61 (0.75) 23.45 (0.98) 36.59 (0.62) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Confidence levels: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
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Figure 3. Predicted number of party/parties articles by month 
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Table 3: Regression coefficients for personalization of Prime Minister v others  
 PM v Cabinet 
(Great 
Offices + 
Other 
Ministers) 
PM v Great 
Offices  
PM v Other 
Ministers 
(Great 
Offices 
excluded) 
Great Offices 
v Other 
ministers 
Time trend 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Coalition -0.196*** -0.135*** -0.147*** -0.076**  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)    
Parliament 
Dissolved 
0.110** 0.011 0.227*** 0.198*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)    
August Recess -0.004 -0.003 0.017 0.012    
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)    
Change of 
PM/government 
-0.310*** -0.172** -0.450*** -0.311*** 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)    
Major international 
summits 
0.045** 0.050* 0.040 -0.001    
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)    
Cabinet reshuffles -0.071*** -0.058* -0.089*** -0.039    
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)    
PM-in-waiting -0.142*** -0.156***  0.045    
(0.03) (0.04)  (0.04)    
DPM 0.011 -0.081***  0.166*** 
(0.02) (0.02)  (0.03)    
Brexit -0.213** -0.273** -0.137 0.158    
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)    
Broadsheet -0.039*** -0.039** -0.027 0.005    
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Yt-1 0.541*** 0.611*** 0.444*** 0.447*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)    
Yt-2 0.067 0.013 0.151*** 0.095**  
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(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)    
Yt-3 0.049 0.067 0.045 0.073    
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)    
Yt-4 0.041 0.025 0.066 0.048    
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)    
Yt-5 -0.006 -0.001 0.068* 0.090**  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)    
Constant -0.748*** -0.263*** -0.466*** -0.354*** 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)    
     
N 572.000 572.000 572.000 572.000    
F 94 76 120 90    
R-sqr 0.730 0.687 0.752 0.722    
Q stat (p of )     
Broadsheet 53.52 (0.07) 35.42 (0.67) 50.28 (0.12) 35.14 (0.68) 
Tabloids 45.43 (0.25) 35.05 (0.69) 46.40 (0.22) 32.49 (0.79) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Confidence levels: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
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Figure 4. Predicted number of articles by month for PM / Great offices  
 
